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v.

Federal/Civil

.

SCENIC RIVERS ASS'N. OF OKLAHOMA
No. 75-545
HILLS (SEC. OF HUD)

v.
SCENIC RIVERS ASS'N. OF OKLAHOMA

(

'-----'

Cert to CA 10
(Lewis, McWilliams

Timely

'

Doyle)

2.
(

1.

CA 10 has held that the National

Stnnmary:

Env i ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) 42 U.S.C . 4321 et

~. ,

-.

r equires
HUD to file an environmental impact statement before
\,.,.:;
a disclosure statement filed with it by a private real
estate developer pursuant to the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act ("the Disclosure Act"), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et
may become effective.

~-,

Both the private developer and the SG

seek certiorari, claiming that this decision is a quantum
..
leap in the application__of NEPA, brings NEPA into conflict

with the Disclosure Act and will cause havoc
,.....,..............

~

in the private

real estate business.
2.
I

'-----

Facts and Decision Below.

The Disclosure

Act was passed in 1968 to prevent abuses in the sale of
_,unimproved tracts of land, by requiring developers to make
full public disclosure of information needed by potential buyers.
It is modeled on the Securities Act of 1933 and parallels that
Act in many respects.

Its basic requirements are that a

developer file a "statement of record" with HUD before
selling any lots, and that the developer furnish a potential
purchaser a "property report" before any contract is signed .
Both documents contain descriptions of the subdivision and
its state of title.
The developer cannot begin selling lots until thirty
days after filing its statement of record which becomes
effective automatically on the thirtieth day unless HUD decides

3.

(

that it is incomplete or inacc urate and requires amendments.
If HUD acts , the effective date is suspended until the
developer files the additional or corrected information.

One

section of the Act provides t hat
[t]he fact that a s tatement of record with
respect to a subdivision has been filed or is in
effect shall not be deemed a finding by the
Secretary that the statement of record is true
and accurate on its face, or be held to mean
that the Secretary has in any way passed upon the
merits of, or given approval to, such subdivision.
Early in 19 74 the Flint Ridge Development Company,
almost ready to start selling off a 3000 lot subdivision adjacent
to the Illinois River in Oklahoma, filed its statement of record
and property report with HUD.
be~ame

effective on May 2, 1974.

the effective
~

d~te,

____

After an amendment, the statement

___.._After the
filing but before

respondents filed suit in E.D. Okla.

(Bohanan, J.) alleging that HUD's allowing the Flint Ridge
statement to become effective would be "major federal action
s ignificantly affecting the quality of the human environment"
under NEPA, and that HUD therefore had to prepare an environmental
impact statement before allowing the statement to become
effective.

On August 2, 1974, by oral order later reduced to

writing , the DC declared the Flint Ridge statement "suspended,
vacated, and held for naught," and enjoined HUD from approving
the Flint Ridge filing until HUD had prepared an impact statement.
CA 10 affirmed.
'---------......
/

/

-.

There was no question, according to

r

4.

(
CA 10, that a large real e state deve lopment would have a
significant effect on the environment.

The real issue was

whether HUD's review of t he Flint Ridge filing constituted
"major federal action."

CA 10 felt t hat it did, by analogy

to its previous decis ion in Davis v . Morton, 469 F. 2d 593 (1972),
in which it had held t hat an i mpa ct statement was required
before the Secretary of the Int erior could approve a lease of
land ·by an Indian tribe to a land development company.

The

crux of CA lO's reasoning is this paragraph:
The similarity between our case and Davis
is that both involve filing and approval of
private action. The result of approval here
is that the developer is free to seek funds in
commerce for the development. In each instance
the filing i s a preliminary step which is followed
by substantial consquences to . the environment;
thus, there is action which leads to the development which in turn affects the human environment.
Without discussing why, the court stated that it considered
this case analogous to those in which government funding or
government loan guarantees had been held to be major federal
action requiring impact statements.

"In sum," said CA 10,

"the consequences of the government's approval of the statement
in terms of ease of obtaining funds and in terms of the ultimate
direct consequences on the environment of the building of the
houses" showed that NEPA applied.
CA 10 rejected the appellants'/petitioners' argument
that its holding would bring NEPA and the Disclosure Act into
irreconcilable conflict.

The appellants'/petitioners' concern

5.

was that it would be impossible to prepare an impact statement
wi thin the thirty days the Disclosure Act allows HUD before a
filing becomes effective automatically.

The court thought HUD

c ould slinply suspend the developer's statement of record pending
preparation of the impact statement.
3.

Contentions:

Flint Ridge and the SG make

pre t ty much the same contentions, the difference being that the
SG makes the!!!
'=

~r~

c_Qncisely and forcefully:

~~-=

(a)

...

"

First, the SG emphasizes the potential impact

of CA lO's decision upon HUD's administration of the Disclosure
Act .

The "crushing administrative burden" is illustrated by

the fact that, even if the impact statement requirement is
'

c onfined to future original filings, HUD will be required to
f ile SO% more such statements annually than the most now
\

filed by any agency (432 annually, by the Department of
Transportation).

If the requirement should be extended to all

c onsolidations and amendments of filings as well as original
filings, HUD would have to file ten times as many statements
annually.

Should it be extended to all filings on record,

HUD would have to file almost twice as many impact statements
as have been filed by the entire federal government from the
passage of NEPA to this date (3,344 final statements to date;
HUD has 7,000 filings on record).
(b)

Second, it would seem that CA lO's reasoning also

would apply to securities filings under the 1933 Act, since
t he Disclosure Act was modeled on that earlier statute.

In

6.

(
fact, the DC for the District of Columbia, in an

un~ppealed

decision, already has held that NEPA applies to securities
registrations.

National Resources Defense Council v. SEC,

389 F . Supp. 689 (1974) .
(c)

Third, CA 10 has misread both the language

and the purpose of NEPA.

NEPA requires inclusion of an impact

statement uin every reconnnendation or report on proposals for
• • • major federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment."

Under the Disclosure Act HUD makes

no recommendation or report on a proposal for major federal
action; it simply assures adequate disclosure by the private

(_

developer.

The purpose of NEPA, to make agencies consider

environmental factors in their decision-making, does not apply

in the case of the Disclosure Act, since HUD has no substantive
authority over the developer and does not even pass on the
"merits" of his project.

CA 10 erred in analogizing the

Disclosure Act to statutes involving federal funding, guarantees,
approval , and licensing, for here HUD simply has no power
whatsoever over the private party's actual decision to
develop the land.
(d).

CA lO's holding brings NEPA into conflict with

the Disclosure Act, since it is impossible to prepare an impact
statement within the thirty days accorded HUD by the Disclosure
Act before a filing becomes effective.

Contrary to whAt CA 10

said, supra, HUD cannot simply suspend the registration until

7.
(

the impact statemen t is prepared, for the Disclosure . Act
specifically limits HUD's suspension power to situations in
which the developer has fa iled to make sufficient disclosures.
The very purpose of t he t hirty-day provision is to assure that
t he r equirement of regis tration does not cause developers costly
delays.
(In i ts own petition Flint Ridge frames this particular
point a bit mor e dr amat i cally.

It claims that CA lO's

dec ision amounts to a holding that NEPA "repealed by implication"
the thirty-da y provision of the Disclosure Act, in the face of
this Courtt s s tatement in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(197 3) , that NEPA was not intended to effect such repeals of
other le gi sla tion.

In addition, Flint Ridge claims that the

delay caus ed by the preparation of impact statements will throw
untold numbers of developers into bankruptcy.)
Respondents answer each of these contentions.

First,

t hey no te that CA lO's decision seems to require an impact
statement only f or new original filings, so HUD's figures on
the number of statements that could be required if filings on
record and amendments were covered are speculation at the moment.
Second, they note that the SEC apparently has deci ded to live
with the impact statement requirement imposed by the decision
of the DC for the District of Columbia, since that agency did
not appeal .

Third, CA 10 did not misread NEPA, since HUD- obviously

take s action which leads to a substantial effect on the environment.

8.

Moreover, internal HUD regulations provide for consideration
of environmental

factor s~

including f i ling of an

~pact

statement, in the cour se of all HUD activities not specifically
exempted by the regulat ions t hemselves, and passing upon
statements of record f rom developer s is not an exempted activity;
thus, it seems that HUD its e lf recognizes that NEPA applies
in this situation.

Finally, HUD's concern for the effect of

delay upon the thirty-day provis i on of the Disclosure Act
rings hollow when one considers statistics showing that 90% of
the filings already are held up beyond the thirty days due
to HUD suspension orders (for amendments to complete the filings
or correct misleading portions) .
4.
case.

Discussion:

Obviously this is an important

CA lO's decision probably would not be extended to cases

in which Disclosure Act filings are amended or consolidated,
as the SG fears, since concern with the environmental impact
of a real estate development logically should arise and be dealt
with one time only, at the beginning.

Nor would one expect

a sane court to require HUD to suspend in wholesale fashion all
filings already on record in order to investigate the
of subdivisions already being sold.

~pact

Even with the impact

statement restricted to the future original filings, however,
CA lO's decision will result in a substantial burden on HUD
and costly delays for the private developers.

A reasonable

person can wonder whether Congress intended or even foresaw

1

9.

this effect upon the Disclosure Act, a relatively simple
piece of consumer protection legislation, when it passed NEPA.
Both sides cite a lot of lower court cases in efforts
to s how that application of NEPA to the Disclosure Act is or is
n ot a giant step beyond previous applications.
is that it is a significant
'WE=-' ::wuz~.......- - . . .

departu~~=

My impression

simply insuring full

,_,

d isclosure in a transaction between two private parties seems
a far cry from becoming in some sense an active partner by
loaning or giving money, guaranteeing a loan, approving the
t ransaction on its merits or licensing a party to make the
transaction.

CA lO's position is, in effect, that NEPA applies
a

anytime t he federal government has the power to stop/privat e
t ransaction that will affect the environment.

Stated differently,

anytime Congress sets up a regulatory scheme that gives an
agency the power to require information in connection with a
private transaction, and to prohibit the transaction until the
i nformation is forthcoming, NEPA would apply on the theory
that every failure to stop a transaction that could have
environmental consequences would be "major federal action."
No one has illuminated the SEC's failure to appeal
its own adverse r uling.

A wild guess is that the SEC thought

it would be hard for someone to trace a particular securities
offering through a company's financial maze to its ultimate
effect upon the environment, and therefore thought the DC's
decision would not hurt too much.

.•

.

The SG notes, however, that

10.

the SEC has informed him it wants certiorari granted in this
case, too.
The failure of the HUD internal regulations spec:ifically
to exempt Disclosure Act approvals from the regulations'
environment -related requirements may be the result of HUD's
oversight or its feeling that no one would ever think the
approvals were covered at all.
Considering all factors - the effect on HUD and on
the private developers, the Lmplications of the decision for
other government regulatory agencies, the possible conflict
created between NEPA and the Disclosure Act - the cases look like
grants.

December 1, 1975

Jordan

DC and CA 10 ops.
in both petns.
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SCENIC RIVERS ASS'N. OF OKLAHOMA

Timely

See Preliminary Memorandum in No. 75-510.
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BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Carl R. Schenker

DATE:

April 9, 1976

No. 75-510 Flint Ridge Dvmt. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn.
No. 75-545 Hills v. Scenic Rivers Assn.

I recommend reversal (which the Docket Sheet indicates
to be almost a foregone conclusion).
It is necessary to begin by noting a distinction
between two possible sources of environmental information:
(1)

the agency and (2) the developer.

The suit below was

to require the agency to file EIS's before ok'ing ILSA filings.
Resolution of that issue will not control whether HUD can or
must seek environmental disclosures from the developers in
the ILSA filings.
1.

Is HUD required to prepare an EIS?

Section 102(2)(C) sets out the prerequisites for an
EIS's'being required:

"[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government

shall "(C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement [on
environmental impact]."

2.

I agree with the SG and Flint Ridge that these prerequisites
do not exist here.
EIS's are not required under NEPA everytime an
environmentally significant project is undertaken by someone.
Rather, they are required when there is a "major federal
[action] significantly affecting the . . . environment."

It

is conceded that there is a significant [effect]" here, but
it is difficult to find a "major federal [action]."

This

is so because the statutory role of the federal government
with respect to these subdivisions is so tangential - involving
not a substantive decision, but only requiring full disclosure.
The entire "action" here thus is by the developers, with HUD
playing a completely passive role of requiring complete
disclosure.

As far as impact on the environment goes, the

statutory situation is more or less the same as is would be
in the absence of ILSA.
Given this, there are only two paths by which the
Court could be faithful to the requirement that EIS's be
filed only where there is a "major federal [action]."
(1)

The first is to hold that HUD's approval of

ILSA filings is not "major federal [action]."

(2)

The

second would be to hold that NEPA implies a grant of authority
to HUD to block subdivisions because they are environmentally
unsound.

This would give HUD's approval qn "active" component.
It is to be doubted that by requiring EISsfor "major

3.

federal actions", Congress intended to convey substantive
authority on agencies to convert what were not "major
federal actions" into such actions.

Therefore the first

course must be followed, and the decision below must be
reversed.
2.

Filings by the Developers.

Respondents really present no contrary argument.
Their principal argument, and that of the amici, is not so
much that there is "major federal [action]" as that it would
be useful to make this information available to the public,
the developers, and the state authorities who can do something
about possible environmental damage by the developers.
argument, however, puts the cart before the horse.

This

The

purpose of § 102(2)(C) does not seem to be informing the
~·

public per

Rather it is to require federal decisionmakers

to take environmental factors into account in choosing their
options.

Here "choice" by the federal decisionmakers plays

no role.

When that is the case, it seems unlikely that Congress

would have wanted to finance general-education EIS statements.
That, however, does not mean that there is no role for NEPA
to be used as respondents suggest.

HUD and Flint Ridge agree

that NEPA may authorize HUD to require environmental disclosures
from the developers in their ILSA filings.
was not the suit below.

*

*

Footnote on next page.

That, howver,

4.

Summary:

(1)

HUD is not required to file an

EIS because its role in approvin g ILSA filings is not "major
federal [action]."
(2)

HUD may nonetheless have authority to require

disclosures from the developers, though that question is
not at issue here.
CARL

* I could not find the complaint anywhere in the
papers. But the DC opinion makes it appear that the only
cause of action was on whether the agency had to complete an
EIS. I might mention that
NRDC v . SEC, 387 F. Supp. 689,
involved the same question that-will nor-De reached here namely, what the SEC could or should require by way of
environmental i nformation in a registration statement. It
did not impose on the agency any burden of preparing EIS
statements.
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-I find, after reviewing tbe briefs in the above cases,
that I think it beat for me to recuse myself.
~.. ~

l' • '

Io view of tbe possible retroactive impact of an
affirmance of CAl0 1 a holding, 1 could have a conflict
of interest. ~
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